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The Allocation Problem in Multiple-Claimant
Representations
Paul H. Edelman, * Richard A. Nagareda, * * and
Charles Silver***
Multiple-claimant representations-class actions and other
group lawsuits-pose two principal-agent problems: Shirk-
ing (failure to maximize the aggregate recovery) and misallo-
cation (distribution of the aggregate recovery other than ac-
cording to the relative value of claims). Clients have dealt
with these problems separately, using contingent percentage
fees to motivate lawyers to maximize the aggregate recovery
and monitoring devices (disclosure requirements, client con-
trol rights, and third-party review) to encourage appropriate
allocations.
The scholarly literature has proceeded on the premise that
monitoring devices are needed to police misallocations, be-
cause the fee calculus cannot do the entire job. This paper
shows that this premise is mistaken and that its consequence
has been to misdirect our understanding of the importance of
information problems and bargaining costs in attorney-client
relationships. In fact, it is relatively straightforward, as a
mathematical matter, to design a two-part contingent fee
arrangement that incentivizes a lawyer to both maximize the
aggregate recovery and allocate it according to relative claim
values. The failure of the market for multiple-claimant repre-
sentations to generate fee arrangements of this type therefore
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reflects the operation of empirical factors, not the inherent
limits of contingent fees.
We believe the principal barriers are information and bar-
gaining costs. Two-part contingent fee arrangements require
more information than claimants or attorneys are likely to
possess and require more expensive negotiations than the
monitoring devices the market actually employs. Monitoring
devices are thus cheaper substitutes for more refined contin-
gent fee arrangements, rather than unique solutions to alloca-
tion issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multiple-claimant representations, including mass tort cases, class
actions, and other group lawsuits, pose two principal-agent problems.
Clients must fear that attorneys will shirk, and they must worry that
lawyers will misallocate recoveries. Traditionally, clients have dealt
with these concerns separately. They have used contingent percent-
age fees to motivate lawyers to maximize aggregate recoveries, and
they have used a variety of other methods-disclosure requirements,
client control rights, third-party review, or some combination thereof,
depending upon the context involved-to encourage appropriate di-
vision of recovered funds.'
The scholarly literature has proceeded on the premise that the
foregoing state of affairs is necessary-in particular, that non-fee con-
trols on the allocation of recovered funds are needed because design
of the fee calculus cannot do the entire job. In a leading exposition,
Bruce Hay contends that optimal contingent fee arrangements cannot
simultaneously motivate lawyers to maximize aggregate recoveries
and allocate those recoveries appropriately amongst multiple clients.
Writing about class actions, Hay argues that an optimal contingent
fee, which solves the maximization problem by tying counsel's fee to
the aggregate recovery, necessarily leaves counsel indifferent between
all possible allocations, because the same percentage must apply to
all claimants. When the percentage is level, the lawyer's fee is the
same regardless of the manner of allocation. One could eliminate this
indifference by having the fee cap vary, but such an approach would
encourage the lawyer to allocate the entire recovery to the claimants
whose fee percentages were the highest. For this reason, Hay con-
Discussions of means to handle allocation-related problems in mass actions can
be found in Charles Silver and Lynn A. Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plain-
tiffs' Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 Va L Rev 1465 (1998); Charles Sil-
ver and Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 Wake
Forest L Rev 733 (1997).
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cludes, "the optimal fee cap will do no better than ensure that the
class as a whole receives in settlement the value of its claims. It can-
not solve distributional problems within the class.' 2
Hay's stance rests on the premise that an optimal fee formula is in-
herently unable to handle the allocation problem. We think that this
premise is mistaken and that its consequence has been to misdirect the
debate over the allocation problem. The interesting question is not
how to construct some method other than the fee calculus to address
the allocation problem but, rather, why the market for legal represen-
tation in the multiple-claimant context has not gravitated toward the
kind of fee calculus that would provide lawyers with the incentive both
to maximize the aggregate recovery and to allocate it appropriately In
this article, we show that the barrier to use of a fee calculus to advance
both goals is one not of technical design but, rather, of information.
In Part II, we frame the allocation problem, initially explaining
why a lawyer might allocate an aggregate recovery in some manner
other than according to the relative value of the claims resolved and
thereafter turning to the methods currently used to address the allo-
cation problem. In Part III, we challenge directly the premise of the
current literature by presenting a method of fee calculation that both
motivates lawyers to maximize aggregate recoveries and encourages
them to allocate those recoveries according to the relative value of
the claims resolved. We show, in short, that it is relatively straightfor-
ward, as a mathematical matter, to design a fee calculus to do what
the current literature believes cannot be done simultaneously.
In Part IV, we generalize this method and, in Part V, we address its
implications. Most significantly, the optimal fee design turns upon
the assumption that parties have complete information about the
relative value of their claims. The realism of this assumption clearly
is open to challenge in the market for multiple-claimant representa-
tion. Knowledge of claim values varies greatly and often is incom-
plete. Still, even when the assumption is inaccurate, as it virtually al-
ways is, clients confront an information problem, not an inherent
limitation in the design or flexibility of contingent fee arrangements.
Client control rights, disclosure requirements, third-party review, and
other methods of addressing the allocation problem therefore are best
understood as market responses to information shortages-responses
more efficient than the negotiation process that would be needed to
implement a fee calculus along the lines we derive-rather than as
measures that respond to inherent limitations in contingent fees. A
brief conclusion follows.
2 Bruce L. Hay, The Theory of Fee Regulation in Class Action Settlements, 46 Am
U L Rev 1429, 1472 (1997).
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II. THE ALLOCATION PROBLEM UNDER
CURRENT LAW
In this article, we start from the premise that contingent percentage
fees are capable of providing lawyers for multiple claimants with ap-
propriate incentives to maximize the aggregate recovery for such per-
sons.3 The precise details and operations of contingent percentage
fees in this regard are the subject of a substantial literature.4 We put
aside those micro-level details here in order to focus attention on the
relationship between contingent percentage fees and the allocation
of the aggregate recovery amongst the implicated claimants.
We posit misallocation to consist of the allocation of the aggregate
recovery in a manner other than according to a reasoned understand-
ing on the lawyer's part of the relative value of the underlying claims.
In a given area of civil litigation, the "value" of claims may be a func-
tion of many different factors. Some claimants among those jointly
represented by a given lawyer might face statute-of-limitations prob-
lems, whereas others might not. Some or all claimants might face
obstacles with regard to particular elements of their cause of action
against the defendant-in the mass tort context, for example, diffi-
culty in proving the existence of a causal relationship between the de-
fendant's product and the diseases from which some or all claimants
suffer. For purposes of clear exposition in subsequent parts of this ar-
ticle, we posit a comparatively streamlined situation in which the
relative value of claims turns simply upon their relative damages.
Our argument, however, does not depend upon such a stylized ren-
dering of claim value. The equating of claim value with damages
simply enables us to separate the allocation problem from the distinct
challenges that a lawyer might face in collating-if only in a rough,
back-of-the-envelope way-multiple considerations that might bear
upon expected claim value.5
The important question to ask in framing the allocation problem
is: Why might a lawyer with appropriate incentive to maximize the
aggregate recovery nonetheless misallocate that recovery? Here, one
must distinguish between two contributing sources: The first con-
3 By making this assumption, we do not mean to imply that contingent percentage
fee arrangements align the interests of principals and agents perfectly They do not. See
text accompanying and sources cited in note 16.
1 On the economics of contingent fees, see, e.g., Albert H. Choi, Allocating Settle-
ment Authority under a Contingent-Fee Arrangement, 23 J Legal Stud 585 (2003);
Rudy Santore and Alan D. Viard, Legal Fee Restrictions, Moral Hazard, and Attorney
Rents, 44 J L & Econ 549 (2001); Bruce Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25
J Legal Stud 503 (1996).
' As long as the relative sizes of the damages are the same as the relative sizes of
the value of the claim, it makes no difference which one we use for purposes of our fee
design.
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sists of sheer randomness arising from lawyer indifference; the sec-
ond stems from lawyer incentives that arise from matters aside from
her fee from the client for the particular representation.
In Hay's formulation, there is no "incentive" to misallocate, prop-
erly understood. Rather, misallocation will occur simply because the
lawyer, having maximized the aggregate recovery per the applicable
contingent percentage fee, has no economic reason to care how the
recovery is allocated. The lawyer, in short, will be indifferent as among
possible allocations and, as such, would be expected to allocate ran-
domly.6 If the allocation in a given instance happens to correspond to
the relative value of claims, that is simply the result of random variation.
Other considerations, distinct from the fee to be gained from the
client, may provide the lawyer with an affirmative incentive to mis-
allocate. In the settlement context, the defendant may condition its
agreement to settle upon the allocation of the recovery by the plain-
tiffs' lawyer in a particular manner unrelated to relative claim value-
for instance, in the context of commercial or consumer litigation in-
volving multiple claimants, an insistence that the allocation benefit
claimants with whom the defendant has ongoing business relations
over claimants who are otherwise similar but who are no longer
transacting business with the defendant.7
Misallocation might also stem from the mixture of arrangements
by which multiple claimants have come to be represented by a com-
mon lawyer. The lawyer may be obligated to pay a "forwarding fee" or
"referral fee" with regard to the claimants referred to her by others
but to pay no such fee as to claimants that she obtained herself. As a
result, the lawyer would have an incentive, at the margin, to misallo-
cate in favor of those claimants as to whom no fee must be paid.8
6 See Hay, 46 Am U L Rev at 1471 (cited in note 2). Like Hay, we put aside for the
moment the ethical strictures that might lead the lawyer to avoid misallocation, even
where it would serve her economic interests.
7 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Conflicts, Consent, and Allocation After Amchem
Products-Or, Why Attorneys Still Need Consent to Give Away Their Clients'Money,
84 Va L Rev 1541, 1545 (1998) (")E]ven if the plaintiffs' attorney is neutral as to the var-
ious subgroups within the class, the attorney still has no incentive to resist an alloca-
tion plan favored by the defendant, who often has an interest in preferring one sub-
group within the class over another!').
I See Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client
Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U Chi Legal F 519, 572. A
recent dispute between law firms in mass tort litigation over the diet drug combination
fen-phen illustrates the potential for misallocation when a law firm settles multiple
cases, some recruited by the settling firm itself and some obtained from another firm
through a referral arrangement. There, the referring firm sued the firm receiving the re-
ferrals, alleging that the latter had allocated the proceeds of aggregate settlements in such
a manner as to reduce the payment to the former for the cases it referred. See Parker &
Waichman v Napoli et al, No. 065388/01 (NY Sup Ct Dec. 2, 2004), available at http://
decisions.courts.state.ny.us/fcas/FCAS-docs/2004DEC/30060538820013SCIV.PDF;
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Another incentive for misallocation may arise from the lawyer's
desire to enhance her credibility in the recruitment of future clients
in the same area of litigation. One criticism leveled against multiple-
claimant representations in asbestos litigation, for instance, is that
they tend, when settled in aggregate, to overpay claimants without
present-day physical impairments and to underpay claimants with
severe asbestos-related disease. 9 Such a misallocation nonetheless
may enhance the credibility of the lawyer in the subsequent recruit-
ment of additional unimpaired claimants, persons likely to be greater
in absolute number than those with asbestos-related disease at a given
time.'0 A related consideration, both in the mass tort context and
elsewhere, consists of differing attitudes toward risk on the part of the
claimants themselves. Persons with high-dollar-value claims or who
might die soon may be more likely to settle cheaply, relatively to the
expected value of their claims in the event of trial.I
How does the law currently address the possibility of misalloca-
tion, whether out of indifference or affirmative incentive? Client con-
trol rights entitle clients to reject offers that pay them less than they
want. 2 In single-client representations, these control rights enable
claimants to guard against shirking by their agents, which may occur
because even an optimal contingent fee arrangement fails to align
perfectly the interests of client and lawyer. In multiple-claimant liti-
gation, the right to reject a settlement also affords a client a degree of
protection against misallocation when a group-wide settlement of-
fer is received. A client who believes that a claim is worth more than
her assigned portion of a group-wide deal can reject the offer and in-
sist on going to trial. The effect, as Howard Erichson has noted, is to
make the would-be settling defendant care not merely about the ag-
gregate amount of the settlement but also about whether its alloca-
tion is sufficiently appealing to each claimant as to induce her to
Jonathan Glater, When Law Firms Collide, Things Sometimes Get Ugly, NY Times C2
(Feb 12, 2005).
9 See, e.g., Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1283
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 33 (2000) (statement of Pro-
fessor Christopher E Edley, Jr., Harvard Law School). This tendency intertwines in the
asbestos context with the willingness of some courts to consolidate for trial both im-
paired and unimpaired claimants, a procedural move thought to increase the settle-
ment value of the latter. See id at 97-99 (statement of Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Yale Law School).
10 See Michelle J. White, Resolving the "Elephantine Mass," Regulation 48 (Sum-
mer 2003) ("In order for representing asbestos claimants to be profitable business,
plaintiffs' law firms must be able to obtain compensation for unimpaired claimants").
" Charles Silver, Merging Roles: Mass Tort Lawyers as Agents and Trustees, 31
Pepp L Rev 301, 310 (2004).
12 On a client's right to control settlement, see Restatement (Third) of the Law Gov-
erning Lawyers § 22(l) (2000).
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accept.' 3 The plaintiffs' attorney also acquires an interest in allocat-
ing the fund in a manner calculated to elicit favorable reactions from
clients. This may be so for two reasons. First, agreements governing
mass settlements typically contain walk-away provisions that require
participation by large numbers of plaintiffs. Rejections by large num-
bers of clients can kill deals, costing attorneys their fees. Second, high
participation levels may increase attorneys' returns on their sunk in-
vestments in negotiations. At the margin, every client who accepts
his or her share of a group-wide deal provides an additional increment
in fees that comes at little cost to the plaintiffs' attorney, once the
terms of the deal have been inked.
Disclosure requirements-which arise under agency law, the law
governing lawyers, and, in particular, the aggregate settlement rule-
also help clients police misallocations. Agency law and the law gov-
erning lawyers require attorneys to tell clients everything they rea-
sonably need to know to make informed decisions on matters relating
to a representation. 4 The aggregate settlement rule, a creature of le-
gal ethics that applies to multiple-client representations, particular-
izes this obligation.'5 The rule requires a lawyer to give each client ac-
cess to information about the nature of other clients' claims and the
amounts other clients are to receive. On the theory that an educated
client can more easily identify and object to a misallocation than an
ignorant one, disclosure requirements make misallocations less likely.
Special masters and judges may improve allocations by removing
attorneys from the process or by subjecting attorneys' recommenda-
tions to independent review. In mass actions, special masters are em-
ployed to avoid charges of favoritism that might otherwise be leveled
against attorneys. In class actions, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(e), which serves as an at-law contract between principals who can-
not readily bargain among themselves, requires judicial review of set-
tlements. In both contexts, use of neutral third parties is thought to
make appropriate allocations more likely
The premise of the current literature is that each of the foregoing
measures arises from the impossibility of using contingent percentage
fees to police simultaneously the problem of recovery maximization
and the problem of allocation. As we now show, this premise is false.
13 See Erichson, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 572-73 (cited in note 8).
'1 See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 381 (1958) (subjecting an agent to a duty
to "give his principal information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him and
which, as the agent has notice, the principal would desire to have and which can be
communicated without violating a superior duty to a third person"); Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 20 (requiring a lawyer to "explain a matter to
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions").
'1 See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(g) (2004).
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III. USING CONTINGENT FEES TO ADDRESS
BOTH MAXIMIZATION AND ALLOCATION
PROBLEMS: AN EXAMPLE
Suppose an attorney represents two clients, A and B. The clients' claims
are identical except that A's damages are twice as great as B's. Assume
further that the market rate for legal services is 30% of the money re-
covered. A sizable literature demonstrates that this traditional contin-
gent fee arrangement will not align the interests of the principals and
their agent perfectly.16 Even so, plaintiffs most often use contingent
fee arrangements when retaining attorneys, and these arrangements
often best suit their needs. We therefore use the 30% fee as the base-
line for our analysis. Nothing depends on the choice of the 30% level,
as we show in Part IV. Moreover, depending on the exact nature of an
alternative fee arrangement, it may be possible to extend our method
of dealing with the allocation problem to the alternative fee structure.
Our goal is to set the fee for the attorney in such a way as to ac-
complish three objectives. First, we want to provide an incentive for
the attorney to seek the largest settlement possible, i.e., the fee should
be an increasing function of the value of the settlement.'7 Second, we
want to provide an incentive for the attorney to allocate the proceeds
of the settlement so that A receives twice as much as B. That is, we
want the fee to be at its maximum when the allocation of the pro-
ceeds is correct. Finally, we want the attorney to be awarded 30% of
the proceeds if she meets the goal of allocating the proceeds correctly.
To meet all of these objectives we propose that the fee awarded to
the attorney (F) be computed according to the formula
16 See, e.g., Murray L. Schwartz and Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of
the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 Stan L Rev 1125 (1970); Patricia
Munch Danzon, Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation, 14 Bell J Econ 213
(1983); Geoffrey Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J Legal Stud 189
(1987); Terry Thomason, Are Attorneys Paid What They're Worth? Contingent Fees
and the Settlement Process, 20 J Legal Stud 187 (1991); James D. Dana, Jr. and Kather-
ine E. Spier, Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in
Attorney Compensation, J L, Econ, & Org 349 (1993); Hugh Gravelle and Michael Wa-
terson, No Win, No Fee: Some Economics of Contingent Legal Fees, 103 Econ J 1205
(1993); Daniel Rubinfeld and Suzanne Scotchmer, Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An
Economic Analysis, 24 RAND J Econ 343 (1993); Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and
Agency Costs, 25 J Legal Stud 503 (1996); Winand Emons, Expertise, Contingent Fees,
and Insufficient Attorney Effort, 20 Int'l Rev L & Econ 21 (2000); A. Mitchell Polin-
sky and Daniel Rubinfeld, Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients, 5 Amer L &
Econ Rev 165 (2003); Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman, Incentive Structures for Class
Action Lawyers, 20 J L, Econ, & Org 102 (2004); Winand Emons, Conditional Versus
Contingent Fees, University of Bern Discussion Paper No. 04.08, available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=550301 (May 24, 2004).
7 As we just noted, while providing an incentive to the lawyer, our fee structure may
or may not prevent the lawyer from shirking, and thus not maximize the settlement.
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(1) F = KxPA3P1 1'3
where PA and PB are the amounts paid to client A and B, respectively,
and the constant K is given by the value
.3
(2)(22/(113
The exponents of PA and PB are chosen so that given any particular
settlement sum, the fee is maximized when PA is twice PB. The value
of K is chosen so that the fee earned when the proceeds are distrib-
uted so that PA receives twice the amount of PB is exactly 30% of the
total proceeds.18
Figure 1 illustrates the impact of the fee formula for all possible
allocations between A and B of a $300 settlement fund. We have
graphed the fee F as a function of P,. The fee is maximized when PA
is $200, or 2/3 of the total settlement. The value of the fee is then $90,
or 30% of the $300 fee. Any division other than ($200, $100) produces
a smaller fee for the attorney.
F Fees
80
60
40
20
P
50 100 150 200 250 300
Figure 1
Obviously, any recovery smaller than $300 would also reduce the fee.
If a $300 recovery was available but the attorney was to "leave money
on the table," the fee would decline. Thus, a $270 recovery would yield
18 This will become evident from the calculations in the next section. In particular,
see equation 8 infra.
104 The Allocation Problem in Multiple-Claimant Representations
a maximum possible fee of only $81, which the attorney would gen-
erate by dividing the recovery ($180, $90) between A and B. Given the
assumption that 30% is both the prevailing market rate and the opti-
mal fee, it efficiently reduces the likelihood of underperformance.
IV. GENERALIZING THE ANALYSIS
It is a standard application of calculus to see that the pattern described
in Part III will always hold when fees are set according to the identi-
fied formula. Suppose the value of the settlement is S. If A receives PA
then B receives S - PA* The fee received by the attorney is then
(3) F = K x PA/3(S - PA)W3.
The attorney will want to choose PA so that F is maximized. In order
to calculate that value, we need to compute the derivative of F as a
function of PA which turns out to be
(4) dF = 2 x K x P1/3(S - PA)1/3 - K x P 2/3(S - PA) - 2/3.
dPA 3 3
The maximum for F will be the value of PA for which this derivative
is 0.19 Setting the derivative equal to 0 and solving for PA leads us to
2-~ 1 A-23(5) 2 x K x PfI/"(S-PAY/ = xKx PA2/3 (S- P-333
If we multiply both sides of this equation by the quantity, we get
(6) 2x(S-PA)=PA
which implies that
(7) 2xS=3xPA.
and hence PA = 2/3S when the fee is at its maximum. That is, the at-
torney will maximize her fee by allocating two-thirds of the settle-
ment to A and one-third to B. The value of the fee at that allocation is
- x2/3 1"x/3 . 2/3 11/3
(8) F=Kx i I S . 3  2  s =3 x S,
19 Technically we should also check that the second derivative at this value is neg-
ative in order to be sure that the critical point is a maximum. The graph in Figure 1
should make clear that the critical point is indeed a maximum. The actual calculation
is tedious and so we will leave it as an exercise for the reader.
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so if the attorney allocates the money in the optimal way she can re-
cover 30% of the settlement in fees.
This method of assessing fees generalizes to an arbitrary number
of clients. As long as one knows (1) the optimal contingent fee per-
centage (which we assume to be 30%) and (2) the ratio of claim val-
ues that one desires to achieve, for reasons of equity or other sorts,
one can write a function for the fee that will motivate the attorney to
distribute the settlement fund appropriately and thereby maximize
the fee. The details appear in the appendix.
Although the formula shows how to compute the attorney's fee, it
does not show how responsibility for paying the fee should be allo-
cated among the clients. If the attorney is due a $90 fee for obtaining
a $300 settlement and allocating it ($200, $100) between A and B,
one could take the entire $90 from A's share or from B's and one could
split the sum between them. In settlements involving larger num-
bers of clients, the fee might exceed any single client's share of the
recovery, but even then many options for allocating responsibility
would remain.
The most straightforward way to allocate responsibility for the fee
is to have each client pay the same proportion of the fee as he or she
receives of a total settlement.20 Thus, a client who receives 25 % of a
settlement fund would pay 25% of the total fee. In our two-client ex-
ample, the total settlement is $300, client A receives $200 (66%), and
client B receives $100 (33%). The total fee of $90 would be collected
as $60 from client A and $30 from client B.
Of course, if the attorney misallocated the recovery, on this ap-
proach the clients' contributions would automatically change. If A
and B both received $150, for example, the lawyer's fee would be
$85.04 and each client would pay half. Importantly, as long as the fee
is a function of the total recovery, no inter-principal competition
emerges for the services of the agent. Saul Levmore has shown that
such a competition arises when a joint agent handles multiple mat-
ters that generate different marginal returns on effort for the agent. 21
When an hour spent attempting to sell House 1 generates an expected
$2000 in commissions and an hour spent attempting to sell House 2
generates only an expected $500 in commissions, the agent will ra-
tionally try to sell House 1. This creates a problem for the owner of
House 2, that of monitoring the agent to ensure that House 2 is mar-
keted properly.
20 This is by no means the only way to allocate the fee. For a brief survey see H. Pey-
ton Young, Equity in Theory and Practice 64 (Princeton, 1994).
21 Saul Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts in Agency Arrangements: Lawyers,
Real Estate Brokers, Underwriters, and Other Agents' Rewards, 36 J L & Econ 503
(1993).
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The two-part contingent fee described here does not foster an inter-
principal competition, regardless of how responsibility for paying
the fee is apportioned among the clients. This is so because the per-
centage is level and the claims are aggregated. The lawyer maximizes
the fee by maximizing the recovery for all members of the group. This
does mean that the lawyer will focus effort and other resources on
claims and certain aspects of claims (e.g., damages or causation) that
are expected to generate the most "bang for the buck." This will not
harm any client, however, because the second part of the contingent
fee arrangement will encourage the attorney to allocate the recovery
in a manner that benefits all claimants in proportion to the value of
their claims. All clients will therefore benefit from their common
attorneys' efficient effort to maximize the value of the entire block
of claims. 22
As economists will recognize, our fee function takes the form of a
Cobb-Douglas production with constant returns to scale.2 The con-
stant returns to scale imply that the maximum of the function will
be proportional to the size of the settlement. This is not to say that
there are no other fee functions with the requisite properties. A Cobb-
Douglas production function simply is convenient for our purposes.
To underscore the importance of the recognition that a single con-
tingent fee arrangement may handle both the maximization and the
allocation problem, we note the connection between our solution to
the allocation problem and Nash's solution to the bargaining prob-
lem.24 In the bargaining problem, a group of claimants must decide
how to divide some common property The utility each claimant gets
from any particular amount of the common property is known. The
question is what constitutes a "fair" division of this common asset.21
22 The penalty that the attorney faces for misallocating the recovery may be mod-
est and may also decrease as a percentage of the settlement as the number of claimants
grows. Because the surface defined by the allocation function is quite flat at the opti-
mum, deviations from it do not alter the fee very much. As long as the attorney is mo-
tivated to maximize his fee, the flatness will not make a difference to our analysis. If,
however, he is faced with side payments as an inducement to misallocate, then it would
be important to understand in more detail how the allocation function behaves away
from the optimum point. We will not attempt to do that here. This difficulty arises be-
cause of the specific function we propose for the allocation and may not be inherent to
the problem of allocation. We thank Pierre Grosdidier for pointing out this subtlety in
the analysis.
23 Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics 249 (Prentice Hall
5th ed, 2001).
24 J. Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 21 Econometrica 128 (1953). Our discussion
will follow the explication of Nash's theory in Young, Equity in Theory at 119 (cited in
note 20).
25 The issue in this version of the bargaining problem is solely a prescriptive, theo-
retical one. We are only concerned with some definition for what constitutes a fair di-
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Nash postulated a number of axioms that turn out to characterize
a unique division of the asset. He postulated that a "fair" division
should be consistent,26 efficient,27 impartial, 28 and scale-invariant.29
He then showed that the only division method that satisfies all these
conditions is one that gives each claimant an amount such that the
product of all claimants' utilities is maximized.
For example, suppose that two people, A and B, are trying to divide
$300, that the utility that A receives from an allocation of PA dollars
is , and the utility B receives from an allocation of PB dollars is p1/3.
The Nash solution to this bargaining problem is the allocation that
generates the largest possible product. The computation performed
above shows that this allocation gives $200 to A and $100 to B.
One can thus interpret our solution to the allocation problem in
the following way: Clients A and B instruct their attorney to divide
the settlement for them in a "fair" fashion, where "fair" is interpreted
in the sense of Nash and where the clients' utilities from shares in the
recovery are directly related to value of their claims. To create an in-
centive for the attorney to allocate the recovery fairly, her fee is made
proportionate to the product of the utilities A and B get from the al-
location. By choosing the allocation that maximizes this product of
their utilities (the "fair" allocation) the attorney maximizes the fee.
We have chosen just the right utility functions so that the allocation
will conform to the value of the claim of each client.30
vision given the utility gained by each claimant as measured by his utility function.
We are not concerned with a method by which they might achieve this "fair" division
or with the empirical question of whether the particular "fair" division that we will
discuss is achieved in practice.
26 Consistent means that the method gives the result to any subset of the claimants
if the payments to the others remain fixed. As an example, suppose that when divid-
ing among three claimants a sum of $1000, the method results in an allocation of $300,
$500, and $200 to claimants A, B, and C, respectively Being consistent means that this
method will always divide $800 among claimants A and B as $300 and $500 respec-
tively, i.e., the same way that the $800 from the larger amount was divided between A
and B, whether or not there are other parties involved.
27 Efficient means that the entire asset is distributed.
28 Impartial means that outcome depends only on the utility functions themselves
and not on any other feature of the claimant.
29 Scale-invariant means that the outcome is independent of the units of measure-
ment of the utilities.
30 We note that there are competing notions of a "fair" allocation that lead to differ-
ent solutions. The most well-known alternative solution is that of Kalai and Smorodin-
sky See E. Kalai and M. Smorodinsky, Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem,
43 Econometrica 510 (1975). Their solution consists of one in which "each claimant
is indifferent between his portion and a fixed chance at getting all of the goods."
Young, Equity in Theory at 120 (cited in note 20). In our hypothetical case, the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution would give claimant A $185.41 and give claimant B $114.59.
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V. IMPLICATIONS
Given the theoretical possibility of designing contingent percentage
fee formulae to address both maximization and allocation problems,
the important question becomes why competitive markets have not
produced such arrangements. To anticipate the argument that fol-
lows, the principal impediment is that the parties lack the informa-
tion needed to implement the scheme or, perhaps more precisely, that
they find the costs of acquiring the necessary information to be suf-
ficiently high as to content themselves with other methods to ad-
dress the allocation problem.
In order to implement our solution, each client needs to know the
value of her own claim as well as the value of the other clients' claims.
The value of a given claim will consist of two parts: the size of the dam-
ages incurred by the claimant and a discount factor that accounts for
the likelihood that the claim will be successful. This discount factor
is related to such things as the quality of the evidence for the claim.
Claimants might have uncertainty about either or both of the parts
that comprise the value of their claims. Claimants, however, are likely
to be at the greatest informational disadvantage relative to their law-
yers with regard to the size of the discount factor, as that is the more
likely to entail the subtle evaluation of matters within the lawyer's
expertise. Indeed, clients hire lawyers precisely to obtain their legal
expertise in the valuation of possible claims.
Complete knowledge of both parts of claim value for all claimants
would not be necessary for the implementation of our fee scheme,
however. The fee structure set forth in Part III turns upon the relative
value of the claims. Thus, if the discount factor is the same for all
claimants-say, because all will encounter the same problems of proof
as to the same substantive element of their claims or are subject to
the same affirmative defense-then it would not be necessary for
claimants to know the actual value of their claims in order to define
the fee function.3'
For example, suppose, as in Abbott v. Kidder Peabody & Co, Inc.,32
that numerous investors were persuaded by allegedly fraudulent
means to put funds into a partnership, which later became insolvent.
To minimize their aggregate litigation costs, the investors might form
a multiple-claimant group. When doing so, they would want to en-
31 A small example will illustrate this fact. Suppose that, in our original example,
client A suffers damages D,, client B suffers damages D , and the discount factor is p.
Then A's claim relative to B's is pDA/pDB which is the same as DA/D. So, if we know
the damages then we can compute the fee even if we do not know the discount factor,
as long as we are confident that the same discount factor applies to all of the claims.
32 Abbott v Kidder Peabody & Co, Inc, 42 F Supp 2d 1046 (D Colo 1999).
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courage their attorneys to maximize the aggregate recovery. They also
might want to plan for the allocation of the recovery in advance, as
joint venturers in speculative undertakings usually do. The only ob-
vious difference between individual investors being the amounts
they lost, the two-part contingent fee formula might suit their needs.
To our knowledge, however, even sophisticated clients like those
in Abbott do not use two-part contingent fee agreements. Instead,
they combine level contingent fee arrangements, which provide attor-
neys with an incentive to maximize aggregate recoveries, with other
mechanisms that enable them to police settlement allocations. The
other mechanisms include allocation formulas, client control rights,
disclosure requirements, special masters, and judicial review, along
the lines discussed in Part 11.33
In Abbott specifically, the plaintiffs established an allocation for-
mula. When hiring their common lawyers, they appointed a steering
committee of lead plaintiffs and authorized the lawyers to settle their
individual claims "on the same terms as those applicable to the per-
sonal claims of the steering committee members. '34 Variations in
settlement payments across plaintiffs would reflect the differing
amounts of money the clients invested.
Why are other mechanisms used to address allocation problems
instead of two-part contingent fee arrangements? The obvious expla-
nation is that they are more efficiently deployed. Consider Abbott
again. Because the clients' claims differed only in size and size was
transparent to all concerned, the clients could have used a two-part
contingent fee formula to encourage their common attorneys to allo-
cate the recovery correctly. However, the part of the formula relating
to the allocation would have had to contain a variable for each client
to reflect that client's fractional share of the aggregate claim. The for-
mula would also have had to change as new clients joined the group
or old ones left. Given the transparency of claim size, it was easier for
the clients to agree that any recovery would be allocated according to
the amount invested than to bother with this.
Our observation is of general importance. In theory, two-part con-
tingent fee formulas can solve both maximization and allocation
problems when claim values can be established objectively However,
when this condition is met, allocation formulas, disclosure require-
ments, and client control rights are all likely to be cheaper alterna-
tives that work roughly as well.
Other means of handling allocation problems are also likely to be
See Silver and Baker, 84 Va L Rev 1465 (cited in note 1); Silver and Baker, 32 Wake
Forest L Rev 733 (cited in note 1).
m Abbott, 42 F Supp 2d at 1049 (cited in note 32).
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more efficient when clients cannot verify claim values objectively or
lack information about claim values for other reasons. Using a two-
part contingent fee arrangement in this situation would require ex-
tensive bargaining up-front, expending resources that might be con-
served. It would also leave the final allocation on a subjective footing
and, therefore, would not obviously be superior to an allocation ne-
gotiated or agreed to at the end of litigation.
To frame the responses to the allocation problem in current law in
terms of their relative efficiency, moreover, is not to suggest that the
status quo deploys optimally all possible responses. One line of com-
mentary on class actions, for example, highlights the limitations upon
thoroughgoing judicial review of the allocations made in class settle-
ments. This literature points to expanded use of opt-out rights as a su-
perior method, in some contexts, to police the quality of representa-
tion afforded by class counsel-for instance, by enabling rival firms
within the plaintiffs' bar to compete for the allegiance of particular
subgroups within the class who might regard themselves as likely to
be shortchanged by a proposed class settlement.3 5 The relative merits
of judicial review and inter-firm competition to guard against mis-
allocations in class settlements nonetheless center on informational
questions-whether the reviewing court or the would-be rivals of class
counsel stand to have, or to obtain, superior information about the
relative value of claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have sought to reframe the debate over the allocation
problem in multiple-claimant representations. The problem is not
that contingent percentage fees are inherently incapable of providing
lawyers with incentives both to maximize aggregate recoveries and to
allocate them according to relative claim value. To the contrary, as we
have shown, it is possible to design a two-part contingent fee arrange-
ment to address both the maximization and the allocation problem.
The illuminating question is why the market for multiple-claimant
representations does not employ a fee arrangement along the lines we
have described but, instead, uses disclosure requirements, client con-
trol rights, third-party review, or some combination of such methods
to address the allocation problem. The answer, we cautiously infer, is
that these non-fee methods offer solutions more efficient for lawyers
35 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 Colum L Rev 370, 422-28 (2000);
Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Ac-
tion, 103 Colum L Rev 149, 168-74 (2003).
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and claimants than the process of bargaining that would be needed to
pursue a two-part contingent fee. The central point remains: The al-
location problem is properly framed as a debate over relative effi-
ciency in the overcoming of informational barriers, not as a debate
necessitated by an inherent limitation of fee design.
Appendix
In this appendix we will give the general solution to the allocation
problem for an arbitrary number of clients. We will assume that the
clients are numbered {1,2, . . . ,n} and that client i is deserving of the
percentage ri of the settlement, for each i, where ri is a number be-
tween 0 and 1 and the sum of all of the ri's is 1. In addition assume that
the attorney deserves a target percentage t of the settlement as a fee.
Let F(P1, ... ,Pn) be the function defined by
t n
P npr i
i=i
Lemma The function F(P1,... ,Pn) achieves its maximum under the
condition that InP = S when Pi = r1S for each i. For those values of Pi
the value of F is tS.
Proof: We apply the theory of Lagrange multipliers to this optimiza-
tion problem. Consider the function G(P1, ... ,PnX) defined by
G(Pj..., Vn,) = F(P,..., Vn) Y- -S.
The maximum of F given that ynP 1 = S can be found by computing the
partial derivatives of G, setting them equal to 0, and then solving for
the values of P, and X. It is easy to check that for each value of i we
have that
Pi
and
G nPyj -i i - S
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Setting the first set of equations to 0 reveals that
Pi Pi
for all values of i and j. Fix j and then we see that Pi = (r1/r,)P, for all i. Set-
ting the second equation above to 0 and plugging in for Pi results in
n r P n Pi=
i=l r, r j i= rj
and so at the maximum we have that Pi = rIS. Plugging these values in
for F we see that
F(rS,... , rnS) = t (riS)ri =  t rirm Sri= t- J-JrS -tS
l ' -r ri in r ir i i = l i l H r ir i i = l
i=l i= M
which is what we needed to show.
